does not admit the refutation of kareth. (1) Then let him adduce the guilt-offering too? (2) — The feature common to both is that they apply to the whole community as to an individual, (3) Alternatively he does admit the refutation of kareth, but Ben ‘Azzai had a tradition. (4) And when R. Huna said [that he inferred it] a fortiori, he said this only in order to sharpen his disciples. (5) MISHNAH. IF ONE SLAUGHTERED THE PASSOVER-OFFERING OR THE SINOFFERING NOT IN THEIR OWN NAME, [AND] HE RECEIVED [THE BLOOD], WENT [WITH IT], AND SPRINKLED [IT] NOT IN THEIR OWN NAME, OR IN THEIR OWN NAME AND NOT IN THEIR OWN NAME, OR NOT IN THEIR OWN NAME AND IN THEIR OWN NAME, (6) THEY ARE DISQUALIFIED. HOW IS ‘IN THEIR OWN NAME AND NOT IN THEIR OWN NAME’ MEANT? — IN THE NAME OF THE PASSOVER-SACRIFICE [FIRST] AND [THEN] IN THE NAME OF A PEACE-OFFERING. ‘NOT IN THEIR OWN NAME AND IN THEIR OWN NAME’ [MEANS] IN THE NAME OF A PEACE-OFFERING [FIRST] AND [THEN] IN THE NAME OF THE PASSOVER-OFFERING. FOR A SACRIFICE CAN BE DISQUALIFIED AT [ANY ONE OF] THE FOUR SERVICES: SLAUGHTERING, RECEIVING, CARRYING AND SPRINKLING. R. SIMEON DECLARES IT VALID IN THE CARRYING, BECAUSE HE ARGUED: [THE SACRIFICE] IS IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT SLAUGHTERING, WITHOUT RECEIVING AND WITHOUT SPRINKLING, BUT IT IS POSSIBLE WITHOUT CARRYING. [HOW SO]? ONE SLAUGHTERS IT AT THE SIDE OF THE ALTAR AND SPRINKLES [ FORTHWITH]. (7) R. ELIEZER SAID: IF ONE GOES WHERE HE NEEDS TO GO, AN [ILLEGITIMATE] INTENTION DISQUALIFIES [IT]; WHERE HE NEED NOT GO, AN [ILLEGITIMATE] INTENTION DOES NOT DISQUALIFY [IT]. (8) GEMARA. Does then receiving disqualify? Surely it was taught: And they shall present: (9) this refers to the receiving of the blood. You say, This refers to the receiving of the blood: yet perhaps it is not so, but rather it means the sprinkling? When it says, And they shall dash [the blood], (10) lo, sprinkling is stated, hence to what can I apply, ‘And they shall present’? It must refer to the receiving of the blood. Aaron's sons, the priests (10) [teaches] that [these services] must be performed by a legitimate priest (11) [robed] in priestly vestments. (12) Said R. Akiba: How do we know that receiving must be performed by none but a legitimate priest [robed] in priestly vestments? ‘Aaron's sons’ is stated here, while elsewhere it says, These are the names of the sons of Aaron, the priests that were anointed: (13) as there it refers to legitimate priest[s] [robed] in priestly vestments, (14) so here too it means by a legitimate priest [robed] in priestly vestments. R. Tarfon observed: May I lose my sons if I have not heard a distinction made between receiving and sprinkling, yet I cannot explain [what it is]! Said R. Akiba: I will explain it. In the case of receiving intention was not made tantamount to action, whereas in the case of sprinkling intention was made tantamount to action. (15) [Again] if one received [the blood] without [its proper precincts], he is not liable to kareth, whereas if one sprinkles [it] without, he is punished with kareth. If unfit men received it, (16) they are not liable on its account, if unfit men sprinkled it, they are liable on its account. Said R. Tarfon to him, By the [Temple] service! You have[not] deviated to the right or the left! (17) I heard [it] yet could not explain it, whereas you investigate it and agree with [my] tradition. In these words he addressed him: ‘Akiba! whoever departs from thee is as though he departed from life!’ — Said Raba: There is no difficulty: the one refers to an intention of piggul, (18) while the other [our Mishnah] refers to an intention for the sake of something else. This too may be proved, because it teaches, FOR A SACRIFICE CAN BE DISQUALIFIED, but it does not teach, ‘For a sacrifice becomes Piggul’. This proves it. Now, does not an intention of Piggul disqualify it [the sacrifice] at the receiving? Surely it was taught: You might think that an intention [of Piggul] is effective only at the sprinkling; whence do we know to include slaughtering and receiving? From the text, And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace-offerings be at all eaten on the third day, it shall not be accepted. . . it shall be an abhorred thing [Piggul]; (19) Scripture treats of the services which lead to eating. (20) You might think that I also include the pouring out of the residue [of the blood] and the burning of the emurim; therefore it states,... on the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be imputed unto him that offereth it. (21) Now sprinkling was included in the general statement, (22) and why was it singled out? That an analogy therewith might be drawn , intimating: as sprinkling is a service and is indispensable for atonement, so every [act which is a] service and is indispensable for atonement [is included]; thus the pouring out of the residue and the burning of the emurim are excluded, since these are not indispensable for atonement!23—

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(1). ↑ Because it does not feature in the same way in both of them. For the sin-offering is brought for a sin of commission which involves kareth, whereas it is the omission to bring the Passover-offering that entails kareth.
(2). ↑ That it is invalid when slaughtered under a different designation, by the same analogy. V. supra 10b, where the analogy is proposed but rejected because kareth is not involved in the guiltoffering. Since, however, Ben Azzai does not admit that this is a refutation, the analogy stands.
(3). ↑ A sin-offering may be incurred by the whole community, just as by an individual, v. Lev. IV. The Passover-offering too, though brought by individuals, is a communal (public) sacrifice, since the whole community must bring one (Yoma 51a). But a guilt-offering is never brought by the whole community.
(4). ↑ In respect of the burnt-offering, as stated in the Mishnah. Hence he does not infer it a fortiori at all.
(5). ↑ Challenging them, as it were, to find the fallacy in his statement.
(6). ↑ I.e., one of the services was for its own sake and another was for a different purpose, in the order stated.
(7). ↑ Where it is straightway sprinkled. Since then the blood may not be carried at all, the sacrifice cannot be disqualified if it is carried for a different purpose.
(8). ↑ The Gemara discusses this.
(9). ↑ Lev. I, 5.
(10). ↑ Ibid.
(11). ↑ Which excludes one of profaned birth, e.g., the issue of a divorced woman, and one suffering from a physical blemish or defect; v. Lev. XXI, 7, 17.
(12). ↑ Lit., ‘service vessels’ (here, robes). ‘The priests’ implies that they must be vested as priests.
(13). ↑ Num. 111,3.
(14). ↑ Legitimate, since Nadab and Abihu, Eleazar and Ithamar, Aaron's sons, are enumerated (v. 2). ‘Robed in priestly vestments’ is deduced from the end of the verse: whom he consecrated to minister in the priest's office; cf. Lev. XXI, 10: and that is consecrated to put on the garments.
(15). ↑ The reference is to illegitimate intention and action. An illegitimate intention is now assumed to mean an intention to receive the blood in the name of a different sacrifice or to eat of its flesh after the permitted time, which would render it Piggul (q.v. Glos.). Thus an illegitimate intention at the receiving of the blood does not disqualify, which contradicts the view in the Mishnah. — The difficulty is answered at the end of the discussion.
(16). ↑ E.g. , lay Israelites or intoxicated priests.
(17). ↑ You have stated exactly what I heard, but had forgotten.
(18). ↑ Such an intention does not disqualify at the receiving.
(19). ↑ Lev. VII, 18.
(20). ↑ I.e. which permit the consumption of the flesh; these include receiving.
(21). ↑ ‘Accepted’ is understood to refer to the sprinkling, which makes the sacrifice acceptable.
(22). ↑ I.e., as one of the services which ‘lead to eating’.
(23). ↑ Hence the intention of Piggul at the reception of the blood does disqualify it.